Essays · Relationships, Culture and Power

Human Cognition Is Social

Human cognition develops and operates through relationships, language, shared practices and social environments. Thinking is performed by individuals, but it is never formed by individuals alone.

By Yona Ole Lobulu ·

Essay10 min readD10.1

Topic
Relationships, Culture and Power
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2 pieces should be read before this one
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About 10 minutes of reading
Difficulty
Late reading: this page sits at the far end of the Library, after many other pieces

The question

How can the mind be individual and social at the same time?

A thought happens within an individual. It depends on that person's body, nervous system, memories and present condition.

Yet the resources used to form that thought did not originate there alone.

Before we can explain an idea, evaluate a claim or reflect on our own thinking, we are already participating in a social world. Other people direct our attention, respond to our actions, name parts of our experience and demonstrate ways of interacting with the environment. We encounter categories, symbols and practices that existed before us.

Thinking is performed by individuals, but it is never formed by individuals alone.

This creates a question at the centre of human cognition:

How can the mind be individual and social at the same time?

What it means to say cognition is social

In psychology, social cognition often refers to how people perceive and understand other people: how we interpret intentions, recognise emotions or reason about social situations.

This essay addresses a broader question. It concerns how cognition in general develops and operates through participation in social worlds. It does not replace every specialist use of the term social cognition.

Cognition is socially shaped when its development, contents, tools or patterns of operation are influenced by relationships and shared practices. Other people affect what information becomes available, what receives attention, which interpretations appear credible and which cognitive tools a person learns to use.

This is not the same as saying that society thinks instead of the individual. It does not make everyone in the same culture cognitively identical. Nor does it turn people into passive recipients of whatever their environment presents.

The isolated-mind account makes one mistake: it treats social influence as something added to a largely self-forming cognitive system. Social determinism makes the opposite mistake: it treats the person as the mechanical product of language, culture or social structure.

Human cognition fits neither picture.

The mind is individual without being isolated. Its activity is embodied in a person, while many of the resources through which that activity becomes possible are socially developed.

Cognitive development begins in relationship

Children do not first construct complete minds and then enter society. Cognitive development begins while they are already dependent on and engaged with other people.

Caregivers respond to expressions, repeat sounds, demonstrate actions and organise opportunities for exploration. Through these exchanges, children encounter more than information. They begin to learn what other people are attending to, what an action may mean and which parts of a situation matter.

Joint attention offers one example. It occurs when two people coordinate around a shared object or event. A caregiver might look towards a dog, direct the child's attention and name what they see. The child is not merely exposed to an object and a sound. The interaction helps connect another person's communicative behaviour to something in the world.

Shared engagement does not always depend on explicit eye contact or pointing. Different communities organise interaction through different combinations of gaze, touch, movement, speech, proximity and participation in ongoing activity. Across these variations, the important feature is coordination: one person's behaviour helps organise another person's access to a shared referent.

Research connects joint attention with language learning and later communicative development, but it should not be treated as a single cause that determines either outcome. Its significance varies with age, context and the other resources available to the learner (Yoon & Frank, 2019; Salo et al., 2018).

This is where D4.1 — Development Changes the Meaning of Change becomes essential. An experience does not act on a neutral or unchanging person. What someone can take from an interaction depends partly on the capacities, constraints and developmental conditions present at that moment.

A demonstration that is useful at one stage may be confusing, irrelevant or unnecessary at another. Relationships create opportunities and constraints, but their effects emerge through the developing individual.

We learn what to notice and how to respond

Other people shape cognition partly by organising learning.

Humans learn through observation, participation, teaching, testimony, imitation and feedback. These processes can transmit practical skills, but they can also transmit ways of selecting and interpreting information.

When someone demonstrates how to use a tool, they separate relevant actions from a field of other possibilities. When a teacher corrects an answer, the learner receives information about both the answer and the standard by which it is judged. When people consistently react to an event as dangerous, sacred, embarrassing or desirable, they make a particular interpretation more available.

Imitation is not simply automatic copying. Learners attend to who is acting, what the apparent goal is and whether the observed action seems necessary. They may reproduce one action because it appears to produce a result and another because it seems to express a convention: not this is how the object works, but this is how we do it. Imitation can therefore serve both instrumental and social purposes (Over, 2020).

These processes connect D10.1 to D5.1 — What Is Learning?, but the concepts must remain distinct.

Learning refers broadly to change through experience. Some learning occurs through direct interaction with the non-social environment. Social influence concerns how other people, relationships and shared arrangements organise what information becomes available, credible or important.

Social learning is one pathway through which social worlds enter individual cognition. The social formation of cognition is broader. It also includes language, norms, roles, institutions and inherited tools that structure the conditions under which learning occurs.

Language gives thought inherited tools

Language is one of the most powerful resources people acquire from others.

Words allow us to mark and communicate distinctions. Symbolic systems help us combine ideas, refer to absent events and preserve information. Through language, people gain access to knowledge they have not discovered through direct experience.

Learning a language involves more than pairing sounds with objects. The learner must also interpret speakers. Context, previous interaction, common ground and communicative cues help establish what someone intends to convey. A familiar sentence can mean different things depending on who says it, in which situation and for what apparent purpose (Yoon & Frank, 2019).

Once acquired, language also supports individual cognition. Naming something can make it easier to compare, discuss or remember. A concept can organise experiences that previously seemed unrelated. Writing can preserve an idea beyond the limits of immediate memory. Mathematical notation can make complex relationships easier to inspect and manipulate.

Language nevertheless remains one part of cognition, not its entirety. People perceive, feel, recognise patterns and perform skilled actions without translating every process into words. A language also does not rigidly determine what its speakers are capable of thinking.

The more defensible conclusion is that language provides inherited cognitive tools. It can make certain distinctions easier to express, preserve or use habitually without fixing the boundaries of thought.

Culture organises relevance and possibility

Language belongs to a wider field of shared practices.

Every social environment contains conventions about what deserves attention, what counts as credible and how knowledge should be demonstrated. These conventions are expressed through routines, education, institutions, technologies, stories, norms and social roles.

Culture does not act as a single invisible force. Its influence operates through these more specific mechanisms.

Repeated participation in a practice can make some features of a situation more habitually salient. Institutions organise access to information and establish categories through which situations are interpreted. Social roles create expectations about which risks, duties or opportunities matter. The resulting patterns vary across tasks, settings and individuals.

Research illustrates both influence and variation. Children's reliance on social information differs across developmental periods and sampled societies, while also showing some recurring patterns (van Leeuwen et al., 2018). Studies comparing subsistence communities suggest that different forms of social interdependence and everyday activity can be associated with different habitual styles of attention and reasoning (Uskul et al., 2008).

These findings do not divide humanity into fixed cognitive types. Culture is internally diverse, historically changing and entangled with ecology, institutions and material conditions. A measured difference between groups cannot, by itself, reveal which of those mechanisms produced it.

Socially created tools also alter what individuals can do. A calendar reduces demands on prospective memory because people share its symbols and coordinate activity through it. A diagram organises information so that relationships can be inspected more easily. A written record allows knowledge to remain available beyond the memory of any one participant.

Such tools support cognition; they do not think in place of the person using them. Their effects depend on learned practices, individual capacities and the situation in which they are used.

Culture is therefore better understood as an evolving field of meanings, practices and material arrangements than as a programme installed in every member of a group.

Shared worlds do not create identical minds

If cognition is socially shaped, why do people in the same society think so differently?

Because social formation is not replication.

People differ in embodiment, developmental timing, prior learning and relationship history. They occupy different positions within families, institutions and communities. They encounter different models and opportunities. Even when two people receive similar information, they may notice different features, connect it to different memories or assign it different importance.

No one participates in one perfectly coherent culture. A person may move among family traditions, professional communities, religious environments, peer groups and online networks that organise meaning differently. These worlds can reinforce one another, but they can also conflict.

People respond actively to what they inherit. Someone raised with one explanation of success may encounter a community that interprets it differently, compare the two and revise the categories through which they understand their own experience. They may accept some norms, resist others or combine resources that were not originally presented together.

Even resistance has social conditions. To challenge a category, a person must first encounter it. To imagine an alternative, they usually need other concepts, examples or relationships that make the alternative available.

Agency is neither complete independence nor passive conformity. It is the variable capacity to select, combine, revise and act through resources developed under particular conditions.

Shared worlds supply overlapping cognitive tools. They do not guarantee identical uses.

Cognition is individual and social at once

Individual and social explanations are not competing accounts of the same event. They describe interacting parts of it.

Socially developed resources become part of individual cognitive activity. A person uses language to organise a private reflection, applies a learned distinction to a new problem or relies on a shared tool to compare information. In doing so, the person may preserve those resources, modify them or use them in ways others did not anticipate.

Individual activity then feeds back into the social world. New interpretations enter conversations. Revised practices become available for imitation. A private judgment can become public testimony, and a locally developed solution can become part of a community's accumulated knowledge.

Social conditions constrain cognition, but they also enable it. Reading opens access to knowledge accumulated beyond one lifetime. Shared vocabularies allow people to coordinate distinctions without recreating them from the beginning. Communities permit individuals to benefit from discoveries they did not personally make.

Cognition is embodied in individuals, formed through development, modified through learning and organised within social and material worlds.

The person remains the thinker. But the thinking is made possible by a history that extends beyond the person.

To understand a thought, examine the world that helped make it possible

A thought belongs to the person thinking it. Understanding that thought may still require looking beyond the person.

What distinctions did their language make readily available? Which experiences taught them what to notice? Whose testimony became credible? What practices shaped their expectations? Which tools supported memory or reasoning? Which alternatives had they encountered?

These questions do not replace individual explanation. They complete it.

Human cognition is neither an isolated possession nor a uniform social product. It is personally enacted through capacities and resources that develop in relation to other people.

To understand how a person thinks, we must therefore ask not only:

What is happening within this individual?

We must also ask:

What relationships, tools and shared practices helped make this thought possible?
Sources and research record6 sources, with findings, strengths and limitations as entered

References

6 sources this piece rests on, as entered in the Library.

  1. Legare, C. H. (2019) The development of cumulative cultural learning

    Review · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 1 · 119–147

    doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-121318-084848

  2. Over, H. (2020) The social function of imitation in development

    Review · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 2 · 93–109

    doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-033020-024051

  3. Salo, V. C., Rowe, M. L., Reeb-Sutherland, B. C. (2018) Exploring infant gesture and joint attention as related constructs and as predictors of later language

    Empirical study · Infant Behavior and Development, 50 · 76–87

    doi:10.1016/j.infbeh.2017.11.003

  4. Uskul, A. K., Kitayama, S., Nisbett, R. E. (2008) Ecocultural basis of cognition: Farmers and fishermen are more holistic than herders

    Empirical study · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105 · 8552–8556

    doi:10.1073/pnas.0803874105

  5. van Leeuwen, E. J. C. et al. (2018) The development of human social learning across seven societies

    Cross-cultural study · Nature Communications, 9 · 2076

    doi:10.1038/s41467-018-04468-2

  6. Yoon, E. J., Frank, M. C. (2019) The pervasive role of pragmatics in early language

    Review · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 1 · 223–249

    doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-121318-085037

Behind this page

The claims this essay makes, the evidence behind them, and the limits it accepts.

Evidence status

High confidence

Strongly supported, though resting on synthesis or principle rather than a single decisive body of evidence.

Claims

  1. Thinking is performed by individuals but is not formed by individuals alone

    Canonical synthesis

    What this does not assert: The resources used to form a thought are largely acquired from other people.

  2. Demonstration and correction convey standards of judgment as well as content

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: The learner receives information about the answer and about how answers are evaluated.

  3. Imitation serves both instrumental and social functions rather than being automatic copying

    Established

    What this does not assert: Learners attend to who acts, the apparent goal and whether the action seems necessary.

  4. Social learning is one pathway of social influence, and the social formation of cognition is broader

    Canonical synthesis

    What this does not assert: Learning and social influence must remain distinct concepts; they are related, not identical.

  5. Language allows people to mark distinctions, refer to absent events and preserve information

    Established

    What this does not assert: These capacities are acquired from other speakers rather than invented individually.

  6. Language acquisition requires interpreting speakers, not only pairing sounds with objects

    Established

    What this does not assert: Context, common ground and communicative cues establish intended meaning.

  7. Naming, notation and writing can support comparison, memory and manipulation of information

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Support is not the same as replacement of cognitive work.

  8. Language does not rigidly determine what its speakers are capable of thinking

    Contested

    What this does not assert: Strong linguistic determinism is not supported; weaker influence claims remain debated.

  9. Language provides inherited cognitive tools that make some distinctions easier to express and use habitually

    Canonical synthesis

    What this does not assert: This states influence without fixing the boundaries of thought.

  10. Cultural influence operates through specific mechanisms such as routines, institutions, roles, technologies and norms

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Culture is not a single invisible force acting directly on minds.

  11. Repeated participation in a practice can make some features of a situation habitually more salient

    Established

    What this does not assert: The resulting patterns vary across tasks, settings and individuals.

  12. Cognition is socially shaped when its development, contents, tools or operation are influenced by relationships and shared practices

    Canonical synthesis

    What this does not assert: This is a definition of scope, not a claim that society thinks in place of the person.

  13. Children's reliance on social information differs across developmental periods and sampled societies

    Established

    What this does not assert: Some recurring patterns appear alongside the variation.

  14. Different forms of social interdependence and everyday activity can be associated with different habitual styles of attention and reasoning

    Contested

    What this does not assert: Group-level comparisons cannot by themselves identify which mechanism produced the difference.

  15. Measured cognitive differences between groups do not establish fixed cognitive types

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Culture is internally diverse, historically changing and entangled with ecology.

  16. Socially created tools such as calendars, diagrams and written records alter what individuals can do

    Established

    What this does not assert: Their effects depend on learned practices, capacities and situation.

  17. Cognitive tools support the person using them rather than thinking in their place

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Offloading changes the distribution of work, not the locus of the thinker.

  18. People in the same society think differently because social formation is not replication

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Embodiment, timing, prior learning, position and relationship history all differ.

  19. No one participates in a single perfectly coherent culture

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Family, professional, religious, peer and online worlds can conflict as well as reinforce.

  20. People actively select, combine and revise the resources they inherit

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Acceptance, resistance and recombination are all available responses.

  21. Resistance to a category has social conditions, because the category and its alternatives must first be encountered

    Canonical synthesis

    What this does not assert: Agency operates through inherited resources rather than outside them.

  22. Agency is the variable capacity to select, combine, revise and act through socially developed resources

    Canonical synthesis

    What this does not assert: It is neither complete independence nor passive conformity.

  23. Social influence on cognition does not make members of a culture cognitively identical

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Shared worlds supply overlapping tools, not identical uses of them.

  24. Individual and social explanations describe interacting parts of the same event rather than competing accounts

    Canonical synthesis

    What this does not assert: Socially developed resources become constituents of individual cognitive activity.

  25. Individual cognitive activity feeds back into the social world through testimony, revised practice and shared solutions

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Transmission runs in both directions across time.

  26. Social conditions both constrain and enable cognition

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Constraint and enablement are two effects of the same shared arrangements.

  27. Explaining how a person thinks may require examining language, testimony, practices, tools and encountered alternatives

    Canonical synthesis

    What this does not assert: Social explanation completes rather than replaces individual explanation.

  28. Cognitive development begins while children are already dependent on and engaged with other people

    Established

    What this does not assert: Minds are not constructed in isolation and then introduced to society.

  29. Joint attention involves two people coordinating around a shared object or event

    Established

    What this does not assert: Coordination, not eye contact specifically, is the defining feature.

  30. Communities organise shared engagement through different combinations of gaze, touch, movement, speech and participation

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Pointing and mutual gaze are culturally common, not universally required.

  31. Joint attention is associated with language learning and later communicative development

    Established

    What this does not assert: It should not be treated as a single determining cause; its significance varies with age and context.

  32. What a person takes from an interaction depends on the capacities and developmental conditions present at that moment

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: A demonstration useful at one stage may be confusing or unnecessary at another.

  33. Humans learn through observation, participation, teaching, testimony, imitation and feedback

    Established

    What this does not assert: These pathways transmit interpretive habits as well as practical skills.

Sources

  1. Legare, C. H. (2019) The development of cumulative cultural learning

    Review · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 1 · 119–147

    doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-121318-084848

  2. Over, H. (2020) The social function of imitation in development

    Review · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 2 · 93–109

    doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-033020-024051

  3. Salo, V. C., Rowe, M. L., Reeb-Sutherland, B. C. (2018) Exploring infant gesture and joint attention as related constructs and as predictors of later language

    Empirical study · Infant Behavior and Development, 50 · 76–87

    doi:10.1016/j.infbeh.2017.11.003

  4. Uskul, A. K., Kitayama, S., Nisbett, R. E. (2008) Ecocultural basis of cognition: Farmers and fishermen are more holistic than herders

    Empirical study · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105 · 8552–8556

    doi:10.1073/pnas.0803874105

  5. van Leeuwen, E. J. C. et al. (2018) The development of human social learning across seven societies

    Cross-cultural study · Nature Communications, 9 · 2076

    doi:10.1038/s41467-018-04468-2

  6. Yoon, E. J., Frank, M. C. (2019) The pervasive role of pragmatics in early language

    Review · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 1 · 223–249

    doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-121318-085037

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