Essays · Action and Control

Error Monitoring and Behavioural Adjustment

Detecting a mistake and improving because of it are not the same event. Error monitoring makes a mismatch available to influence what happens next; whether that influence becomes useful adjustment depends on the standard applied, the information available and the actions the person can reach.

By Yona Ole Lobulu ·

Essay9 min readD8.7

Topic
Action and Control
Read first
2 pieces should be read before this one
Reading time
About 9 minutes of reading
Difficulty
Late reading: this page sits at the far end of the Library, after many other pieces

The question

What has to happen between an error occurring and behaviour improving, and why does detection so often fail to produce learning?

Definition

Error monitoring is the process through which a system registers that an action, outcome or developing response does not match a relevant standard; behavioural adjustment is what happens when that information alters what the person does next.

You are typing and press the wrong key. Before you have fully considered what happened, you delete the character, retype it and perhaps slow down for the next few words.

This small sequence contains several distinct events. An action departed from what was intended. The departure was detected. Behaviour changed. Yet none of this guarantees that the change was useful or that the same error will be avoided later.

Error monitoring is the process through which a system registers that an action, outcome or developing response does not match a relevant standard. Behavioural adjustment is what happens when that information alters what the person does next.

The relationship appears straightforward: detect the error, correct the behaviour. In practice, the sequence is less reliable. Errors can be detected without being corrected. Behaviour can change without improving. A correction can solve the immediate problem without producing lasting learning.

Understanding error monitoring therefore requires more than asking whether someone noticed a mistake. It requires examining what standard defined the error, what information became available and how that information affected subsequent action.

An error requires a standard

An event is not an error merely because it produces an undesirable outcome. It becomes an error when an action or result is evaluated against a standard it fails to meet.

That standard might be:

  • an intended action;
  • a task rule;
  • a predicted outcome;
  • an external instruction;
  • an established procedure;
  • a broader goal.

If you intend to type change but type chance, the intended word provides the standard. In a laboratory task, the standard might be a rule requiring one button for a red symbol and another for a blue one. In conversation, a response may be judged against the intended meaning or effect.

Different standards can also produce different evaluations of the same behaviour. An action may comply perfectly with an immediate instruction yet work against the broader goal the instruction was supposed to serve. It is then correct relative to one standard and mistaken relative to another.

Error classification therefore depends on which standard is controlling the evaluation. Without that distinction, disagreement about whether an error occurred may actually be disagreement about what the action was meant to accomplish.

Making an error is not the same as detecting it

People do not always become consciously aware of their errors. A response can deviate from a task rule without the person explicitly recognising the deviation. Conversely, a person can experience uncertainty or a sense that something went wrong even when the response was technically correct.

Research using speeded-response tasks has identified neural activity associated with errors shortly after an incorrect action. The error-related negativity, often abbreviated ERN or Ne, can appear rapidly and does not require a lengthy conscious evaluation. Other activity, including the error positivity or Pe, has been associated more consistently with conscious error awareness and later evaluation (Gehring et al., 1993; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001).

These findings do not establish a simple division in which one signal always represents unconscious detection and another always represents conscious awareness. They do, however, support an important distinction: some error-related processing can begin before a person has formed a complete conscious account of what happened.

Error monitoring operates on information about mismatches, conflict and outcomes. That information may come from several sources.

A response may feel different from the action that was intended. Competing responses may become active at the same time. Feedback may reveal that the outcome was wrong. The result may violate a prediction. Another person may identify the discrepancy.

These sources do not always agree. Internal monitoring may indicate that something went wrong before external feedback arrives. External feedback may identify a problem that the person did not detect. Either source may also be unreliable if it evaluates behaviour against an unsuitable standard.

Detection is therefore not a single, infallible signal. It is an evaluation produced from available information.

An error can change the next response

After detecting an error, people often behave differently on the next attempt. They may respond more slowly, check additional information, increase attention to the task or change the response itself.

This is behavioural adjustment: a measurable change following the error.

Research on cognitive control has often interpreted such adjustments as evidence that the system is responding to conflict or poor performance. In conflict-monitoring accounts, information about response conflict signals a need for greater control, which can influence later processing and action (Botvinick et al., 2001).

The adjustment does not have to be deliberate. A person may become more cautious without consciously deciding to do so. Attention may narrow. The threshold for responding may rise. A previously ignored cue may receive more weight.

Behaviour can also change before the person can explain why. This is one reason that error monitoring should not be reduced to verbal self-awareness. The ability to describe an error is one form of evidence, but subsequent behaviour may reveal that the event affected the system even when an explicit explanation is absent.

At the same time, behavioural change alone does not prove that the error was correctly understood. A person might slow down because the event was surprising, because confidence fell or because attention was temporarily disrupted. The change shows that the error mattered. It does not yet show how it was interpreted.

Slower is not necessarily better

One of the most frequently studied post-error adjustments is post-error slowing. In many speeded tasks, responses immediately following an error are slower than responses following a correct action.

A common interpretation is that the person becomes more cautious. By delaying the next response, the system may allow more information to accumulate and reduce the risk of another impulsive error.

Sometimes that interpretation is supported by improved accuracy. But slowing does not consistently produce better performance. A slower response can reflect strategic caution, disrupted attention, surprise or temporary disengagement from the task (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; Notebaert et al., 2009).

An influential integrated account proposes that errors can first trigger a broad interruption of ongoing activity and then, where conditions permit, support more selective task-related adjustment (Wessel, 2018). This should not be treated as a universal sequence for every error. It helps explain why an immediate reaction may be disruptive even when later processing becomes adaptive.

The ambiguity becomes especially important in complex environments. Lewis and Gutzwiller (2023) found that after an error in a multitasking environment, participants could remain excessively focused on the task in which the error occurred and miss a response opportunity in a competing task. The adjustment was related to the error, but it did not improve overall performance.

Post-error slowing is therefore evidence of behavioural change, not a direct measure of successful control. Its meaning depends on what changed alongside the delay.

Did accuracy improve? Was more relevant information considered? Did attention become appropriately focused or excessively narrow? Did performance improve only on one task while deteriorating elsewhere?

Without those comparisons, slower behaviour cannot be classified confidently as better behaviour.

Correction is not the same as learning

An immediate correction can restore performance without creating a durable change.

You may notice a typing mistake, correct it and make the same mistake again a minute later. A driver may take the wrong turn, reverse course and repeat the error on the next journey. A person may recognise that a familiar reaction was unhelpful only after it has already occurred many times.

Correction concerns the present discrepancy. Learning concerns whether relevant processing or behaviour changes beyond that moment.

Evidence of durable learning might include:

  • greater accuracy on later attempts;
  • earlier detection of the developing error;
  • improved discrimination between similar situations;
  • more appropriate action under changed conditions;
  • reduced dependence on external feedback.

Repeated errors do not necessarily mean that monitoring is entirely absent. A person may detect the result but fail to identify its cause. The relevant cue may not be available early enough to guide action. The correct alternative may be known but difficult to execute under pressure. Feedback may arrive after the same response pattern has already been initiated again.

A correction can also be too narrow. If someone responds to one missed deadline by adding more reminders, the immediate problem may disappear. But if the underlying difficulty is an unrealistic workload, reminders may not change the condition producing the error.

For monitoring to support durable improvement, information about the discrepancy must influence something relevant: what is attended to, how the situation is interpreted, which response is selected or how the next attempt is organised.

Even then, improvement should not be assumed. A person can learn the wrong lesson from an error. One failed attempt may lead to excessive caution, avoidance or the abandonment of an otherwise workable strategy. Behaviour has changed, but the adjustment has been calibrated poorly.

Why error monitoring matters for change

Error monitoring gives a system access to information it could not obtain from successful performance alone. A mismatch reveals something about the relationship between an intended action, the conditions in which it was attempted and the outcome that followed.

That information can interrupt automatic continuation. It can make a relevant cue more noticeable, create uncertainty about the current response or increase the probability that another action will be considered.

But the error does not dictate its own solution.

The same detected discrepancy can lead to careful correction, indiscriminate slowing, distraction, defensive explanation, withdrawal or no usable adjustment at all. Which outcome follows depends on the information available, the standard being applied and the actions the person can access in that moment.

This places error monitoring between performance and change. It is not identical to either.

Without monitoring, behaviour may continue despite repeated mismatch. With monitoring, the mismatch becomes available to influence what happens next. Whether that influence becomes useful adjustment depends on how accurately the error is interpreted and whether the resulting response serves the relevant goal.

The practical significance of an error is therefore not exhausted by the fact that it occurred. The more important sequence is:

What departed from the relevant standard? Was the departure detected? What changed afterwards? Did that change improve performance in the appropriate context? Did the improvement persist?

A mistake can produce a correction without learning. It can produce adjustment without improvement. It can also provide the information from which better behaviour becomes possible.

Error monitoring opens that possibility. It does not guarantee the result.

Sources and research record7 sources, with findings, strengths and limitations as entered

References

7 sources this piece rests on, as entered in the Library.

  1. Botvinick, M. M. et al. (2001) Conflict monitoring and cognitive control

    Theoretical review · Psychological Review, 108(3) · 624–652

    doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.624

  2. Danielmeier, C., Ullsperger, M. (2011) Post-error adjustments

    Review · Frontiers in Psychology, 2 · Article 233

    doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00233

  3. Gehring, W. J. et al. (1993) A neural system for error detection and compensation

    Empirical study · Psychological Science, 4(6) · 385–390

    doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00586.x

  4. Lewis, C. M., Gutzwiller, R. S. (2023) Examining post-error performance in a complex multitasking environment

    Empirical study · Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 8 · Article 65

    doi:10.1186/s41235-023-00512-y

  5. Nieuwenhuis, S. et al. (2001) Error-related brain potentials are differentially related to awareness of response errors: Evidence from an antisaccade task

    Empirical study · Psychophysiology, 38(5) · 752–760

    doi:10.1111/1469-8986.3850752

  6. Notebaert, W. et al. (2009) Post-error slowing: An orienting account

    Empirical study · Cognition, 111(2) · 275–279

    doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.002

  7. Wessel, J. R. (2018) An adaptive orienting theory of error processing

    Theoretical article · Psychophysiology, 55(3) · Article e13041

    doi:10.1111/psyp.13041

Behind this page

The claims this essay makes, the evidence behind them, and the limits it accepts.

Evidence status

High confidence

Strongly supported, though resting on synthesis or principle rather than a single decisive body of evidence.

Claims

  1. A single mistake contains several distinct events: departure from intention, detection, and behavioural change

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Founding decomposition.

  2. Standards can be intended actions, task rules, predicted outcomes, instructions, procedures or broader goals

    Established

    What this does not assert: Standard classes.

  3. Error information can make a relevant cue more noticeable

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Attentional consequence.

  4. Error information can create uncertainty about the current response

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Confidence consequence.

  5. Error information can raise the probability that another action is considered

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Selection consequence.

  6. An error does not dictate its own solution

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Canonical thesis.

  7. The same detected discrepancy can lead to correction, indiscriminate slowing, distraction, defensive explanation, withdrawal or no usable adjustment

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Outcome space.

  8. Which outcome follows depends on available information, the standard applied and the actions the person can access

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Determinants.

  9. Error monitoring sits between performance and change and is identical to neither

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Position in the graph.

  10. Without monitoring, behaviour may continue despite repeated mismatch

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Cost of absent monitoring.

  11. With monitoring, the mismatch becomes available to influence what happens next

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Availability, not control.

  12. Whether that influence becomes useful depends on interpretation accuracy and goal relevance of the response

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Closing condition.

  13. In laboratory tasks the standard is typically an explicit response rule

    Established

    What this does not assert: Bounded to task settings.

  14. The significance of an error is not exhausted by the fact that it occurred

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Reframing.

  15. The diagnostic sequence runs from standard, to detection, to change, to contextual improvement, to persistence

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Canonical sequence.

  16. A mistake can produce correction without learning, or adjustment without improvement

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Two failure modes.

  17. A mistake can also provide the information from which better behaviour becomes possible

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Positive case.

  18. Error monitoring opens the possibility of improvement without guaranteeing the result

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Closing formulation.

  19. In conversation a response may be judged against intended meaning or effect

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Everyday standard.

  20. The same behaviour can be correct relative to one standard and mistaken relative to another

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Standard conflict.

  21. An action may comply with an immediate instruction yet work against the goal the instruction served

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Compliance ≠ goal service.

  22. Error classification depends on which standard is controlling the evaluation

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Canonical consequence.

  23. Disagreement about whether an error occurred can be disagreement about the intended accomplishment

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Diagnostic implication.

  24. People do not always become consciously aware of their errors

    Established

    What this does not assert: Occurrence ≠ awareness.

  25. A response can deviate from a task rule without explicit recognition of the deviation

    Established

    What this does not assert: Undetected error.

  26. A person can feel that something went wrong when the response was technically correct

    Established

    What this does not assert: False alarm in monitoring.

  27. Error monitoring registers that an action, outcome or developing response does not match a relevant standard

    Established

    What this does not assert: Working definition.

  28. Neural activity associated with errors has been identified shortly after an incorrect action in speeded-response tasks

    Established

    What this does not assert: Gehring et al., 1993.

  29. The error-related negativity (ERN/Ne) can appear rapidly and does not require lengthy conscious evaluation

    Established

    What this does not assert: Timing evidence.

  30. The error positivity (Pe) has been associated more consistently with conscious error awareness and later evaluation

    Established

    What this does not assert: Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001.

  31. The evidence does not establish that one signal always represents unconscious detection and another conscious awareness

    Contested

    What this does not assert: Interpretation remains open.

  32. Some error-related processing can begin before a complete conscious account of the event has formed

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: The supported distinction.

  33. Error monitoring operates on information about mismatches, conflict and outcomes

    Established

    What this does not assert: Informational basis.

  34. A response may feel different from the action that was intended

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Internal source.

  35. Competing responses may become active at the same time

    Established

    What this does not assert: Conflict source.

  36. Feedback may reveal that an outcome was wrong

    Established

    What this does not assert: External source; see D5.20.

  37. A result may violate a prediction

    Established

    What this does not assert: Prediction-error source.

  38. Behavioural adjustment is what happens when error information alters what the person does next

    Established

    What this does not assert: Working definition.

  39. Another person may identify the discrepancy

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Social source.

  40. Internal monitoring and external feedback do not always agree

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Source divergence.

  41. Internal monitoring may signal a problem before external feedback arrives

    Established

    What this does not assert: Timing asymmetry.

  42. External feedback may identify a problem the person did not detect

    Established

    What this does not assert: Complementary access.

  43. Either source can be unreliable if it evaluates behaviour against an unsuitable standard

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Standard-dependence again.

  44. Detection is an evaluation produced from available information, not a single infallible signal

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Canonical statement.

  45. People often behave differently on the attempt following a detected error

    Established

    What this does not assert: Core empirical regularity.

  46. Post-error changes include slower responding, additional checking, increased attention and altered responses

    Established

    What this does not assert: Adjustment repertoire.

  47. Behavioural adjustment is a measurable change following the error

    Established

    What this does not assert: Definition.

  48. Conflict-monitoring accounts treat information about response conflict as a signal that more control is needed

    Established

    What this does not assert: Botvinick et al., 2001.

  49. Errors can be detected without being corrected

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Detection ≠ correction.

  50. Signals of conflict or poor performance can influence later processing and action

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Theoretical account with empirical support.

  51. Post-error adjustment does not have to be deliberate

    Established

    What this does not assert: Automatic adjustment.

  52. A person may become more cautious without consciously deciding to do so

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Non-deliberate caution.

  53. Attention may narrow after an error

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: One adjustment channel.

  54. The threshold for responding may rise after an error

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Decision-threshold channel.

  55. A previously ignored cue may receive more weight after an error

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Attentional reweighting.

  56. Behaviour can change before the person can explain why it changed

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Adjustment precedes explanation.

  57. Error monitoring should not be reduced to verbal self-awareness

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Methodological boundary.

  58. The ability to describe an error is one form of evidence among several

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Evidence pluralism.

  59. Subsequent behaviour can show that an error affected the system even without explicit explanation

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Behavioural evidence.

  60. Behaviour can change after an error without improving

    Established

    What this does not assert: Adjustment ≠ improvement.

  61. Behavioural change alone does not prove that the error was correctly understood

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Change ≠ comprehension.

  62. Slowing may follow surprise, reduced confidence or disrupted attention rather than strategic caution

    Established

    What this does not assert: Competing interpretations.

  63. A post-error change shows that the error mattered, not how it was interpreted

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Canonical formulation.

  64. Post-error slowing is one of the most frequently studied post-error adjustments

    Established

    What this does not assert: Literature scale.

  65. In many speeded tasks, responses following an error are slower than responses following a correct action

    Established

    What this does not assert: The core finding.

  66. A common interpretation of slowing is increased caution

    Established

    What this does not assert: Standard reading.

  67. Delaying a response may allow more information to accumulate

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Proposed mechanism.

  68. Slowing is sometimes accompanied by improved accuracy

    Established

    What this does not assert: Conditional support.

  69. Post-error slowing does not consistently produce better performance

    Established

    What this does not assert: Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011.

  70. Slowing can reflect strategic caution, disrupted attention, surprise or temporary disengagement

    Established

    What this does not assert: Notebaert et al., 2009.

  71. A correction can solve the immediate problem without producing lasting learning

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Correction ≠ learning.

  72. An orienting account interprets post-error slowing as a response to the infrequency of the error event

    Contested

    What this does not assert: Contested against control accounts.

  73. An integrated account proposes that errors can first trigger a broad interruption of ongoing activity

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Wessel, 2018.

  74. That account proposes selective task-related adjustment can follow where conditions permit

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Second phase.

  75. This should not be treated as a universal sequence for every error

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Explicit boundary on the account.

  76. The account helps explain why an immediate reaction may be disruptive even when later processing becomes adaptive

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Explanatory value.

  77. After an error in a multitasking environment, participants could remain excessively focused on the task where the error occurred

    Established

    What this does not assert: Lewis and Gutzwiller, 2023.

  78. That excessive focus was associated with missed response opportunities in a competing task

    Established

    What this does not assert: Adjustment without benefit.

  79. An adjustment can be genuinely error-related and still fail to improve overall performance

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Canonical inference from the multitasking result.

  80. Post-error slowing is evidence of behavioural change, not a direct measure of successful control

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Central corrective.

  81. The meaning of slowing depends on what changed alongside the delay

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Interpretive rule.

  82. Understanding an error requires identifying the standard that defined it

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Standard-relative account.

  83. Assessing an adjustment requires asking whether accuracy improved

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Diagnostic question.

  84. Assessing an adjustment requires asking whether more relevant information was considered

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Diagnostic question.

  85. Assessing an adjustment requires distinguishing appropriate focus from excessive narrowing

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Diagnostic question.

  86. Assessing an adjustment requires checking whether performance deteriorated elsewhere

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Cross-task cost.

  87. Without those comparisons, slower behaviour cannot confidently be classified as better behaviour

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Evidential standard.

  88. An immediate correction can restore performance without creating durable change

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Core distinction.

  89. A corrected typing error can recur within a minute

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Everyday instance.

  90. A reversed wrong turn can be repeated on the next journey

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Everyday instance.

  91. A person may recognise an unhelpful familiar reaction only after many occurrences

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Late detection.

  92. Correction concerns the present discrepancy; learning concerns change beyond that moment

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Canonical definition pair.

  93. An event is not an error merely because it produces an undesirable outcome

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Outcome ≠ error.

  94. Greater accuracy on later attempts is evidence of durable learning

    Established

    What this does not assert: Learning indicator.

  95. Earlier detection of a developing error is evidence of durable learning

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Learning indicator.

  96. Improved discrimination between similar situations is evidence of durable learning

    Established

    What this does not assert: Learning indicator.

  97. More appropriate action under changed conditions is evidence of durable learning

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Transfer indicator.

  98. Reduced dependence on external feedback is evidence of durable learning

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Links to D5.20.

  99. Repeated errors do not necessarily mean monitoring is absent

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Guards against inference from repetition.

  100. A person may detect a result without identifying its cause

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Detection without diagnosis; see D8.6.

  101. The relevant cue may not be available early enough to guide action

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Timing constraint.

  102. A known correct alternative may be difficult to execute under pressure

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Performance constraint.

  103. Feedback may arrive after the same response pattern has already been initiated

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Feedback latency.

  104. An event becomes an error when an action or result is evaluated against a standard it fails to meet

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Definition of error.

  105. A correction can be too narrow to address the condition producing the error

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Scope failure.

  106. Adding reminders can remove a missed-deadline symptom while leaving an unrealistic workload unchanged

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Worked example.

  107. Durable improvement requires the discrepancy to influence attention, interpretation, response selection or task organisation

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Conditions for learning.

  108. Even when those conditions hold, improvement should not be assumed

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: No guarantee.

  109. A person can learn the wrong lesson from an error

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Miscalibrated learning.

  110. One failed attempt can produce excessive caution, avoidance or abandonment of a workable strategy

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Over-adjustment.

  111. Poorly calibrated adjustment is still behavioural change

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: Change without benefit.

  112. Error monitoring provides information unavailable from successful performance alone

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Informational value.

  113. A mismatch reveals something about intended action, conditions and outcome together

    Canonical inference

    What this does not assert: What errors expose.

  114. Error information can interrupt automatic continuation of behaviour

    High confidence

    What this does not assert: Interruption function.

Sources

  1. Botvinick, M. M. et al. (2001) Conflict monitoring and cognitive control

    Theoretical review · Psychological Review, 108(3) · 624–652

    doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.624

  2. Danielmeier, C., Ullsperger, M. (2011) Post-error adjustments

    Review · Frontiers in Psychology, 2 · Article 233

    doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00233

  3. Gehring, W. J. et al. (1993) A neural system for error detection and compensation

    Empirical study · Psychological Science, 4(6) · 385–390

    doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00586.x

  4. Lewis, C. M., Gutzwiller, R. S. (2023) Examining post-error performance in a complex multitasking environment

    Empirical study · Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 8 · Article 65

    doi:10.1186/s41235-023-00512-y

  5. Nieuwenhuis, S. et al. (2001) Error-related brain potentials are differentially related to awareness of response errors: Evidence from an antisaccade task

    Empirical study · Psychophysiology, 38(5) · 752–760

    doi:10.1111/1469-8986.3850752

  6. Notebaert, W. et al. (2009) Post-error slowing: An orienting account

    Empirical study · Cognition, 111(2) · 275–279

    doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.002

  7. Wessel, J. R. (2018) An adaptive orienting theory of error processing

    Theoretical article · Psychophysiology, 55(3) · Article e13041

    doi:10.1111/psyp.13041

Where to go from here

Next published piece

Intention Is Not Action

Intention is not powerless. Changing it can change what people do. Intention is also not self-executing. A stronger decision does not produce an equivalent or guaranteed change in behaviour.

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